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Struggling for Federal Judicial
Review of Successive Claims of Innocence:
A Study of How Federal Courts Wrestled with
the AEDPA to Provide Individuals Convicted




Assuring Americans that he was "confident that the Federal courts
will interpret these provisions to preserve independent review of Federal
legal claims and the bedrock constitutional principle of an independent
judiciary," President Clinton signed the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA" or "the Act")' into law.2 With
this purported guarantee, the AEDPA ushered in a new, and some would
say radically new,3 regimen of habeas corpus4 requirements that state
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law; J.D. Tulane University,
1987; B.A. University of Wisconsin, 1982. I greatly appreciate the valuable suggestions,
comments, and advice that Randy Coyne and Barbara Bucholtz contributed to this endeavor. Nick
Haugen, as always, provided stellar research assistance. Marley Coyne, once again, exhibited
great patience and tolerance during the writing of this article. Any errors, of course, are mine
alone.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18,
22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.).
2. President's Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 719 (Apr. 29, 1996).
3. See, e.g., Peter Hack, The Roads Less Traveled: Post Conviction Relief Alternatives and
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 Am. J. CRIM. L. 171, 179 (2003)
("AEDPA has radically altered the applicable standards for abusive and successive petitions.");
Kenneth Williams, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: What's Wrong with It and
How to Fix It, 33 CONN. L. REV. 919, 923 (2001) (describing the AEDPA as "the most significant
habeas reform since 1867"); see also Bryan Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death:
Successive Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 699, 706-31
(2002) (tracing the historical evolution of the law of successive habeas corpus petitions).
4. The writ of habeas corpus generally provides a civil remedy that allows a federal court to
review a federal or state prisoner's incarceration to determine whether that incarceration comports
with the federal constitution or federal law. The scope and purpose of the writ have been a source
of controversy, particularly during the twentieth century. See generally LARRY W. YACKLE,
FEDERAL COURTS: HABEAS CORPUS (2003). Given current and proposed federal laws affecting the
writ, such as 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000), Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, H.R. 3035, 109th
Cong. (2005), S. 1088, 109th Cong. (2005), the scope and purpose of the writ will undoubtedly
remain a source of controversy and interest. For a comprehensive examination of the writ see
RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2.4d, at 72-78, § 41.2 (4th ed. 2001).
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and federal prisoners seeking federal habeas relief must meet. Although
the AEDPA adopted and implemented a number of themes and restric-
tions on federal habeas review that the Supreme Court had been articu-
lating and imposing since the late 1970s,5 the AEDPA went further in
erecting roadblocks and barriers for state and federal prisoners seeking
federal habeas review of their convictions and sentences.6 Some of
these obstacles to review created increased complexity and ambiguity
about the habeas review process.7 Other aspects of the AEDPA raised
questions about the constitutional legitimacy of the Act.8 This article
examines one aspect of the AEDPA that creates significant complexity
and barriers to federal court review for federal prisoners with clear
claims of factual innocence. The particular problem considered below
highlights the struggle that innocent prisoners confront when seeking
relief under the AEDPA, and also illustrates the manner by which fed-
eral courts sometimes fashion the necessary federal court review to save
the AEDPA from unconstitutionality.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, federal courts entertained claims
for collateral and habeas relief brought by federal prisoners who were
serving prison sentences for conduct that the Supreme Court had deter-
mined was, in fact, not criminal. Specifically, in 1995, in Bailey v.
United States,9 the Supreme Court held that in order to sustain a convic-
tion for use of a firearm during a drug-related offense under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1), the federal government must present "evidence sufficient to
show an active employment of the firearm by the defendant, a use that
makes the firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate
offense." 10 In 1998, the Supreme Court clarified that this construction
of the law applied retroactively to all federal prisoners convicted under
the statute, regardless of when the erroneous conviction became final.11
5. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, §§ 2.4d, 41.2; Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle,
Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathology of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DuKE L.J. 1, 1-47 (1997).
6. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d), 2255 (2000) (establishing a one-year statute of limitations
for filing petitions and motions); id. §§ 2244(b), 2255 (limiting second and successive petitions
and motions).
7. For example, there have been a number of Supreme Court decisions, not to mention
numerous lower court decisions, in which the Court has attempted to decipher the AEDPA's
statute of limitations. See, e.g., Mayle v. Felix, 125 S. Ct. 2562 (2005); Dodd v. United States,
125 S. Ct. 2478 (2005); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 125 S. Ct. 1807 (2005); Johnson v. United States,
125 S. Ct. 1571 (2005); Rhines v. Weber, 125 S. Ct. 1528 (2005); Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225
(2004); Carey v. Saffold, 312 F.3d 1031 (2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 927 (2003); Duncan v.
Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).
8. See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
9. 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
10. Id. at 143.
11. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998). Under the Supreme Court's modem
retroactivity doctrine, a new rule of criminal procedure generally applies only to those cases in
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Given these holdings, federal prisoners, who had been convicted for
conduct that did not constitute active employment of a firearm during a
drug-related offense, sought relief from federal courts so that they could
be released from serving criminal sentences for noncriminal conduct.
Some of these prisoners had to seek relief pursuant to a second or suc-
cessive motion under the applicable provisions of the AEDPA, since
they had exhausted their direct appeals and had already litigated at least
one collateral motion for relief. Unfortunately, due to the AEDPA's
changes to the rules governing successive motions,' 2 these prisoners
found the courthouse doors closed to them, or at least, quite difficult to
pry open. 13 At best, federal courts found an exception providing a
habeas hearing for certain prisoners with Bailey claims, although reach-
ing this end was far from certain or easy.
To understand the importance of the problem, this article first
examines the history of habeas corpus review for federal prisoners, the
method by which federal prisoners are able to obtain habeas or collateral
review, and the manner in which the AEDPA changed the collateral and
habeas review process, particularly the process for obtaining a second or
successive review. The article then takes an in-depth look at the prob-
lem presented by federal prisoners seeking second or successive habeas
or collateral review of their Bailey claim, the provisions and language of
the AEDPA that obstruct review of these claims, and the way in which
federal courts responded to the obstacles created by the AEDPA amend-
ments. The article finally considers the broader implications and
problems created by the AEDPA and the role of the federal courts in
interpreting these provisions to assure judicial review and, ultimately, to
protect the rights of prisoners.
which the conviction and sentence is not considered "final." See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,
310 (1989). A conviction and sentence is deemed final when the defendant has completed his
direct appeal, including petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari review. Lyn S. Entzeroth,
Reflections on Fifteen Years of the Teague v. Lane Retroactivity Paradigm: A Study of the
Persistence, the Pervasiveness, and the Perversity of the Court's Doctrine, 35 N.M. L. REV. 161,
169-70 (2005). A defendant whose conviction and sentence is final when the new rule is handed
down will not generally receive the benefit of the new rule except under very limited
circumstances. See generally id.
12. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§§ 105, 106, 110 Stat. 1214, 1220-21 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255, 2244 (2000)).
13. Other commentators also have examined this dilemma. See, e.g., Hack, supra note 3, at
190 (discussing AEDPA and alternative post-conviction remedies federal courts may use to grant
relief in cases of improper detention); Randal S. Jeffrey, Successive Habeas Corpus Petitions and
Section 2255 Motions After the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: Emerging
Procedural and Substantive Issues, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 43 (2002) (describing post-conviction
remedies and alternatives to the writ of habeas corpus); Brian M. Hoffstadt, Common-Law Writs
and Federal Common Lawmaking on Collateral Review, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1413 (2002)
(discussing post-conviction remedies in the wake of AEPDA); HERTZ & LtIEMIWA, supra note 4,
§§ 2.4d, 41.2.
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II. FEDERAL COLLATERAL OR HABEAS REVIEW OF A FEDERAL
PRISONER'S CHALLENGE TO THE VALIDITY OF His
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE: THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN 28 U.S.C. § 2255 AND 28 U.S.C. § 2241
Habeas corpus, from the Latin meaning "that you have the body,"' 4
describes certain types of writs, some quite ancient in form, "having for
their object to bring a party before a court or judge." 5 As the writ of
habeas corpus has evolved, it has become a means for a court to test the
legality of an individual's confinement in a federal or state prison.' 6
However, the method and manner by which a federal prisoner may seek
habeas or collateral review to test the legality of his confinement is quite
complicated. Indeed, the current federal habeas corpus system is not
unlike a maze filled with wrong turns, funhouse mirrors, and dead ends
that one must try to navigate before attaining the evermore elusive goal
of meaningful federal habeas review. This article charts a course
through the maze, which a federal prisoner who is incarcerated for
behavior that is in fact not criminal must travel to obtain federal habeas
review. Before traversing this path, however, it is necessary to engage
in an overview of the historic and current methods of habeas and collat-
eral review available to federal prisoners.
A. Historical Overview of Habeas Corpus Review for
Federal Prisoners
The writ of habeas corpus,' 7 described for centuries in Great Britain
and the United States as the Great Writ of Liberty,' 8 existed in colonial
America and is enshrined in the United States Constitution, which guar-
antees: "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be sus-
pended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it."' 9 In giving effect to the writ, the first United States
Congress provided in the Judiciary Act of 1789 that "courts of the
United States, shall have power to issue writs of ... habeas corpus ....
And that either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of
the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for
14. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 1979).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. The roots of the writ of habeas corpus reach back to the English Middle Ages. YACKLE,
supra note 4, at 9.
18. See id. at 15; HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, § 2.3; Hack, supra note 3, at 173-74; ERIC
M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 1 (2001); WILLIAM F.
DUKER, A CoNsTrTUnONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 7 (1980).
19. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 9, cl. 2.
[Vol. 60:75
STRUGGLING FOR FEDERAL JUDICIAL REVIEW
the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment. ' 20 Thus, as
early as 1789, federal prisoners had the ability to seek redress in federal
court, pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus, to examine "the cause of
commitment."
The use of the writ to test federal confinement was an important
part of early federal court review power.21 Although the Judiciary Act
of 1789 authorized lower federal courts to adjudicate violations of fed-
eral penal law,22 it did not provide for direct federal appellate review of
federal criminal convictions rendered by lower federal courts. 23 Rather,
under the Judiciary Act of 1789, review of a federal conviction was
attained, if at all, by means of a writ of habeas corpus. 24 Thus, for cer-
tain classes of federal cases, seeking a writ of habeas corpus under the
Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for a form of direct review that other-
wise was unavailable.25
After the Civil War, Congress amended the federal habeas corpus
statute.26 In the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, Congress provided:
20. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73. The Judiciary Act of 1789 established the
federal judicial system including setting up the lower federal court system and the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction. For further discussion of the Judiciary Act of 1789 see ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION (4th ed. 2001).
21. HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, § 2.4d.
22. Judiciary Act of 1789 §§ 9, 11; see also HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, § 2.4d, at 42.
23. HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, § 2.4d, at 42.
24. Id. at 46 ("In short, as interpreted by the Court, the 1789 Act used habeas corpus review
as a substitute for the Court's direct review of nationally important questions when the latter
review was not meaningfully available to incarcerated individuals. Having withheld from federal
prisoners any right to plenary direct appeal, the Act granted them instead the more limited, but
still appellate, remedy of habeas review of fundamental (including all constitutional) legal
claims.").
25. HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, § 2.4d, at 39-40 ("Federal habeas corpus is not a
substitute for a general writ of error or other direct appeal as of right. Since 1789, however, it has
provided statutorily specified classes of prisoners with a limited and substitute federal writ of error
or appeal as of right. That appellate procedure has been limited because it has lain only to hear
claims of particular national importance - a category of claims that Congress has delineated with
greater specificity over time, but that has consistently been interpreted to include recognized
constitutional claims. It has been a substitute because it has served only in the absence of
Supreme Court review of right."). Scholars have debated the scope of habeas review for federal
prisoners under the 1789 Judiciary Act. For example, Professor Paul Bator argued that early
habeas review was circumscribed, focusing primarily on whether the lower court had jurisdiction
to impose the conviction and sentence. Paul Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HAv. L. REv. 441 (1963). The writings of Professor Bator have
been used to support a narrower role for the modem day writ of habeas corpus. On the other hand,
Professors Hertz and Liebman, as well as Professor Peller, point out that the early Court heard
habeas cases and granted habeas relief in a broader range of cases. HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note
4, § 2.4d; Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 579, 603-07, 611 (1982).
26. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, §1, 14 Stat. 385 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000)).
Congress had previously amended the early habeas statute in the Habeas Act of 1833, thus
empowering federal courts to hear claims where states detained an individual for acts authorized
2005]
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That the several courts of the United States, and the several justices
and judges of such courts, within their respective jurisdictions, in
addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall have power
to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be
restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of
any treaty or law of the United States.27
Among the notable changes that the 1867 Act brought to federal habeas
corpus review was the language providing that the writ may issue when
a person is "restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitu-
tion, or of any treaty or law of the United States"; this language replaced
the earlier "cause of confinement" language used in the Act of 1789.28
In describing this habeas power, the Supreme Court stated, "[t]his legis-
lation is of the most comprehensive character. It brings within the
habeas corpus jurisdiction of every court and of every judge every pos-
sible case of privation of liberty contrary to the National Constitution,
treaties, or laws. It is impossible to widen this jurisdiction."29
Professors Hertz and Liebman describe this early post-Civil War
period - when courts arguably exercised more expansive habeas review,
particularly with respect to federal prisoners - as a "Golden Age" of
habeas review.30 For example, during this period, the Supreme Court
granted habeas relief to federal prisoners in cases involving,3' inter alia,
violations of the Fifth Amendment, 32 Sixth Amendment, 33 and various
by federal law. Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 632, 634. For an excellent discussion on
the history of federal habeas review, including the Habeas Act of 1833, see Peller, supra note 25,
at 616-17, 616 n.196; HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, § 2.4d, at 42; FREEDMAN, supra note 18,
at 1.
27. Act of Feb. 5, 1867 §1.
28. The 1867 Act also explicitly provided the writ to any prisoner, whether held in state or
federal custody.
29. Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. 318, 325-26 (1867). For further discussion on the 1867 Act,
see HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, § 2.4d, at 47-55. In a more recent description of the habeas
power conferred on federal courts by the 1867 Act, the Supreme Court in Felker v. Turpin, 518
U.S. 651, 659 (1996), characterized the 1867 Habeas Act as greatly expanding the scope of the
writ.
30. HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, § 2.4d, at 47-50. For further discussion on the
expansive role of the writ under the 1867 Act, see Peller, supra note 25, at 618-29. For a contrary
view, see Bator, supra note 25.
31. Professors Hertz, Liebman, and Peller argue these cases tend to contradict Professor
Bator's historical analysis of federal court review of writs of habeas corpus. HERTZ & LIEBMAN,
supra note 4, § 2.4d; Peller, supra note 25, at 623-29.
32. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 429 (1885) ("[O]ur judgment is that a crime punishable
by imprisonment for a term of years at hard labor is an infamous crime, within the meaning of the
fifth amendment of the constitution; and that the district court, in holding the petitioner to answer
for such a crime, and sentencing him to such imprisonment, without indictment or presentment by
a grand jury, exceeded its jurisdiction, and he is therefore entitled to be discharged."); see HERTZ
& LIEBMAN, supra note 4, § 2.4d, at 51.
33. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1880) (granting habeas relief for violation of right to jury
trial); see HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, § 2.4d, at 51.
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federal statutes.34 As the Supreme Court stated in In re Bonner,35 "it
should be constantly borne in mind that the writ was intended as protec-
tion of the citizen from encroachment upon his liberty from any
source."
36
According to Professors Liebman and Hertz, this "Golden Age"
began to wane in the early 1890s, when Congress began to provide fed-
eral prisoners with the ability to seek writs of errors in the Supreme
Court, thus establishing direct appellate review of federal convictions.37
With the availability of direct review, the writ of habeas corpus was no
longer the primary method by which a federal prisoner could have his
conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher court.38 Moreover, the
Supreme Court established a requirement that prisoners exhaust federal
direct appeal remedies before seeking habeas review. 39 Thus, federal
prisoners generally had to first raise relevant claims of error with the
applicable appellate court on direct appeal before seeking federal habeas
relief on such claims. Although federal habeas review remained availa-
ble to challenge the validity of a conviction and sentence, it became in
1891, and continues to be today, a collateral post-conviction proceeding
that usually occurs, if at all, after the exhaustion of the direct federal
appeal process.
In 1948, another key statutory modification of federal habeas
corpus occurred when Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254.40
Section 2241, following the expansive language of the 1867 habeas stat-
ute, provides that any Supreme Court justice, or any district or circuit
court judge may issue a writ of habeas corpus to any prisoner "in cus-
tody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States. '41 Likewise, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides that any person held
pursuant to a state court judgment may seek a writ of habeas corpus in
federal court if "he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States."42 Thus, like the 1867 Act, the 1948
habeas statute provides review to prisoners detained by a state or federal
government when such detention violates the federal constitution or fed-
eral law. Sections 2241 and 2254 remain the modern-day habeas stat-
34. E.g., In re Mills, 135 U.S. 263 (1890) (granting habeas relief to prisoner incarcerated in
penitentiary in violation of federal statute).
35. 151 U.S. 242 (1894).
36. Id. at 259.
37. HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, § 2.4d, at 54-56.
38. Id. at 56.
39. Id.
40. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 964-65, 967 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2241, 2254 (2000)).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(4).
42. Id. § 2254(a).
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utes, although significant portions of the habeas statutory scheme, 28
U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255, were amended by the AEDPA. 43 For reasons dis-
cussed below, however, a federal prisoner today seeking collateral
review of his conviction or sentence should move for relief under
§ 2255, which was also enacted in 1948, 44 rather than filing a writ of
habeas corpus under § 2241. The procedural mechanism established in
§ 2255 for collateral review of a federal prisoner's claim provides a
post-conviction process designed to deal with administrative concerns
that arose in the middle of the twentieth century with respect to habeas
petitions filed by federal prisoners.
B. The Relationship Between § 2241 and § 2255
As discussed above, Congress empowered federal courts to hear
habeas petitions of federal prisoners as early as 1789. 4" At the time that
Congress was revising its federal habeas statute in 1948, the venue prac-
tices of the federal courts allocated habeas review to the district court in
the district where the prisoner was incarcerated.46 The practical effect of
this venue requirement was significant. By the middle of the twentieth
century, the number of habeas petitions filed by federal prisoners was
increasing dramatically;47 at the same time, federal prisons were located
in only a few federal districts.4" Thus, there were only a few district
courts where a federal prisoner was likely to be incarcerated and could
file his § 2241 petition. Needless to say, the district courts in these dis-
tricts bore a disproportionate share of the federal habeas petitions.49 In
43. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.).
Prior to the AEDPA amendments in 1996, the 1948 habeas statute was amended in 1949, Act of
May 24, 1949, ch. 139, §§ 112-14, 63 Stat. 89, 105; 1951, Act of Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, § 52, 65
Stat. 710, 727-28; and 1966, Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1104.
44. See 62 Stat. at 967. If, however, a prisoner is challenging the execution of his sentence,
as opposed to the validity of his conviction and sentence, the petitioner proceeds under § 2241.
Thus, for example, if a prisoner wishes to challenge the manner in which parole is calculated, he
would file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241. See infra text accompanying
note 55.
45. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73; HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, §§ 2.4d,
41.2.
46. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212-13, 213 n.13 (1952); HERTZ & LIEBMAN,
supra note 4, §41.2a; see also Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
47. See Hayman, 342 U.S. at 212-13, 213 n.13 (noting that the number of habeas petitions
nearly tripled from 1936 to 1945, and observing that a large number of the petitions were
repetitive or contained frivolous claims); HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, § 41.2a; see also
Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1238-39 (1I1th Cir. 1999) (discussing history of §§ 2241, 2255,
and the disproportionate burden that § 2241 petitions placed on certain district courts in 1948).
48. See Hayman, 342 U.S. at 213-14, 214 n.18 (noting that prior to § 2255, sixty-three
percent of habeas petitions were filed in five of the eighty-four district courts in the United
States); HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, § 41.2a.
49. See Hayman, 342 U.S. at 212-13, 213 n.13; see also HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4,
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response to this problem, as well as other administrative considera-
tions,50 Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2255,1' which was designed as a
procedural post-conviction remedy that would allow prisoners to chal-
lenge the validity of their convictions and sentences in the district where
they were convicted and sentenced. 52 This post-conviction process alle-
viated some of the practical problems of the venue requirements of fed-
eral habeas review by distributing collateral review among most, if not
all, district courts.53
In crafting a post-conviction collateral review process for federal
prisoners under § 2255, Congress provided, in pertinent part:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose
such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum
authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may
move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or
correct the sentence.54
Thus, § 2255 establishes a post-conviction vehicle that allows a federal
prisoner to challenge the validity of his conviction and sentence, without
resort to the writ of habeas corpus. Sections 2241 and 2254 remain the
mechanism for challenging the execution of a prison sentence, which
includes issues such as the terms and conditions of parole or the calcula-
tion of credits towards parole.55
While § 2255 provides a simple, convenient procedural device for
seeking collateral review of the validity of a federal conviction and sen-
tence,56 Congress did not intend § 2255 to limit the purpose or function
of collateral review that prisoners otherwise would have enjoyed under
§ 41.2a; In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 608-09 (7th Cir. 1998) (discussing venue problems that
§ 2255 was intended to cure).
50. An additional practical reason for § 2255 was to provide a post-conviction forum in the
sentencing court where the records and witnesses were more readily available. See Hayman, 342
U.S. at 212; Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1238-39 (noting that a hearing on the validity of a conviction
and sentence is more conveniently held in the sentencing court where witnesses and evidence are
more easily available).
51. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 967.
52. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000).
53. HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, § 41.2a; Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1238-39.
54. 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
55. See, e.g., Jimimian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2001); Charles v. Chandler, 180
F.3d 753, 755-56 (6th Cir. 1999); Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996); Cabrera
v. United States, 972 F.2d 23, 25-26 (2d Cir. 1992).
56. See Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1239 ("The purpose of § 2255 was to clarify and simplify the
procedure and provide an expeditious remedy in the sentencing court without resort to habeas
corpus.").
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§ 2241 or § 2254.57 In considering the scope and function of § 2255,
the Supreme Court stated:
[T]he history of Section 2255 shows that it was passed at the instance
of the Judicial Conference to meet practical difficulties that had
arisen in administering the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal
courts. Nowhere in the history of Section 2255 do we find any pur-
pose to impinge upon prisoners' rights of collateral attack upon their
convictions. On the contrary, the sole purpose was to minimize the
difficulties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the
same rights in another and more convenient forum. 58
Likewise, the Supreme Court has made clear that:
No microscopic reading of § 2255 can escape either the clear and
simple language of § 2254 authorizing habeas corpus relief "on the
ground that (the prisoner) is in custody in violation of the ... laws
• . . of the United States" or the unambiguous legislative history
showing that § 2255 was intended to mirror § 2254 in operative
effect. Thus, we cannot agree that the third paragraph of § 2255 was
in any fashion designed to mark a retreat from the clear statement that
§ 2255 encompasses a prisoner's claim of "the right to be released
upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States."'59
In Davis v. United States,6 ° the Supreme Court considered the
§ 2255 motion filed by a federal defendant seeking collateral review to
vacate his conviction for failing to report for induction into the United
States armed services. 6' The Court stated that, like habeas review,
§ 2255 "permits a federal prisoner to assert a claim that his confinement
is 'in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.' " 62
Where an intervening change in the statutory law renders a conviction
invalid, a prisoner may seek and obtain collateral review and relief under
§ 2255. As the Court stated:
[T]he petitioner's contention is that the decision in Gutknecht v.
United States, as interpreted and applied by the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in the Fox cases after his conviction was affirmed,
establishes that his induction order was invalid under the Selective
Service Act and that he could not lawfully be convicted for failure to
comply with that order. If this contention is well taken, then Davis'
57. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1963) (stating that § 2255 was enacted to
address practical problems with the writ and to provide the same review in the sentencing court as
had been available by habeas corpus); Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1239.
58. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952). For further discussion on Hayman
see HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, § 41.2a.
59. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 344-45 (1974).
60. Id. at 333.
61. Id. at 334-41.
62. Id. at 342-43.
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conviction and punishment are for an act that the law does not make
criminal. There can be no room for doubt that such a circumstance
"inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice" and "pre-
sent(s) exceptional circumstances" that justify collateral relief under
§ 2255. Therefore, although we express no view on the merits of the
petitioner's claim, we hold that the issue he raises is cognizable in a
§ 2255 proceeding.63
In giving effect to this federal court review power, the Court made clear
that the district court hearing a § 2255 motion had power equivalent to
its power in habeas proceedings to redress violations of constitutional
and federal statutory rights.'
Given the expansive scope of § 2255, Congress clearly intended it
as the primary procedural process to challenge the validity of a convic-
tion and sentence:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who
is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section,
shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to
apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that
such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the rem-
edy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention.65
Accordingly, a federal prisoner must move for relief under § 2255; he
may not use § 2241 habeas review to remedy unlawful detentions that
can be remedied under § 2255.
However, § 2255 has not rendered § 2241 a nullity with respect to
federal court review of the constitutional or statutory validity of a con-
viction and sentence. As the language of § 2255 provides, where the
"remedy by motion [under § 2255] is inadequate or ineffective to test
the legality of his detention," a prisoner may seek traditional habeas
relief under § 2241.66 On one level, it seems curious that Congress
should provide any resort to a writ of habeas corpus given that it
intended § 2255 to reach as broadly as § 2241. Perhaps, as Judge Pos-
ner suggests, given that the Suspension Clause prohibits Congress from
suspending the writ of habeas corpus except in cases of rebellion or
invasion, 67 the "outright abolition of habeas corpus for federal prisoners
might conceivably have been held to violate the Constitution. '68 Even
though the legislative history of § 2255 is not clear as to the purpose, or
63. Id. at 346-47.
64. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 214-17 (1952) (reviewing the legislative history
of § 2255, and noting that § 2255 is intended to provide as broad a remedy as habeas corpus).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000).
66. Id.
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
68. In re Davenport, 17 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998).
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even the full scope of the savings clause, it seems apparent nonetheless
that "Congress created a safety hatch: if section 2255 proved in a partic-
ular case not to be an adequate substitute for habeas corpus, the prisoner
could seek habeas corpus. '"69 This safety hatch or savings clause assures
that the writ of habeas corpus remains available to federal prisoners, at
least to some extent, and that Congress, by including a savings clause in
§ 2255, did not violate the Suspension Clause.7 °
While the savings clause has been a part of § 2255 since 1948, and
continues to be a part of § 2255 today, the Supreme Court has not pro-
vided a great deal of guidance on the types of cases that fall within its
ambit. For example, in United States v. Hayman,7t the Court simply
stated that "[i]n a case where the Section 2255 procedure is shown to be
'inadequate or ineffective', the Section provides that the habeas corpus
remedy shall remain open to afford the necessary hearing."72 Perhaps
offering a little insight on the savings clause, the Court in Sanders v.
United States,7 3 suggested that the savings clause might allow a prisoner
to seek a writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 when he was unable to
obtain an adequate hearing on a successive § 2255 motion;74 however,
Sanders was based on pre-AEDPA law and a construction of the writ
that was more generous than current standards.75
As a practical matter, federal courts construe the savings clause in
§ 2255 quite narrowly. For example, § 2241 habeas review is unavaila-
ble where a prisoner simply has been denied relief in his § 2255
motion,76 even if that denial of relief is arguably erroneous.77 Likewise,
§ 2241 is generally unavailable where the district court declines to hear
a § 2255 motion because it is time-barred,78 or where legal claims for
69. Id.; accord Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1240-42 (11th Cir. 1999) (discussing the
legislative history of the savings clause of § 2255).
70. The scope and meaning of the Suspension Clause are hotly disputed. See Felker v.
Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1996); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300-05 (2001); YACKLE,
supra note 4, at 24-25.
71. 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
72. Id. at 223.
73. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
74. Id. at 15.
75. Prior to the AEDPA, some circuit courts indicated that "a motion pursuant to Section
2255 'can be inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of ... detention only if it can be shown
that some limitation of scope or procedure would prevent a Section 2255 proceeding from
affording the prisoner a full hearing and adjudication of his claim of wrongful detention.'" In re
Galante, 437 F.2d 1164, 1165 (3d Cir. 1971) (quoting United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis,
212 F.2d 681, 684 (3d Cir. 1954) (internal quotations omitted)).
76. See, e.g., Darby v. Hawk-Sawyer, 405 F.3d 942, 945 (lth Cir. 2005); Abdullah v.
Hedrick, 392 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir. 2004).
77. See, e.g., Abdullah, 392 F.3d at 963.
78. See, e.g., id. at 959; United States v. Lurie, 207 F.3d 1075, 1077 (8th Cir. 2000).
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relief have been procedurally defaulted.79 To the extent that § 2255 pro-
vides full and fair collateral review, such a limited interpretation of the
savings clause is unlikely to foreclose opportunities to review or to raise
concerns about possible suspension of the writ. However, as one com-
mentator has noted,8" a more restricted § 2255 review, such as that
established under the AEDPA, may pose a different question about the
scope of the savings clause and the constitutional validity of § 2255. To
put this issue in context requires a consideration of the changes the
AEDPA made to § 2255 motions.
C. The AEDPA and § 2255
The AEDPA substantially amended 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255, and
ushered in a new set of restrictions on federal habeas and collateral
review.81 While leaving intact the language from the 1948 statute that a
§ 2255 motion could be brought on the grounds that the federal pris-
oner's "sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States," and also leaving intact the savings clause of
§ 2255,82 the AEDPA nevertheless created significant restrictions on a
federal prisoner's ability to actually move a federal court for such relief.
The AEDPA was the triumph of a movement by certain members
of the judiciary, Congress, and state legislatures to restrict access to and
limit the availability of habeas or collateral relief to state and federal
prisoners.83 Among its stated purposes, the AEDPA was designed to
"curb abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus, and to address the
acute problems of unnecessary delay and abuse in capital cases."84 One
of the ways in which Congress sought to achieve its stated objectives
was by curtailing access to federal court review for federal and state
prisoners. 81 Among the changes implemented to limit access to review
79. See, e.g., Abdullah, 392 F.3d at 959.
80. See Hack, supra note 3, at 190 (observing that since the AEDPA, the savings clause of
§ 2255 "has become the focus of intense debate").
81. For an excellent comparison of the AEDPA and previous habeas law see HERTZ &
LiEBMAN, supra note 4, § 3.1-§3.5b; see also Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 5, at 1-47.
82. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000).
83. See Stevenson, supra note 3, at 706-31; James Liebman, An "Effective Death Penalty"?
AEDPA and Error Detection in Capital Cases, 67 BROOK. L. Rav. 411, 411-16 (2001); Williams,
supra note 3, at 923; Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 5, at 1-47; Donald P. Lay, The Writ of Habeas
Corpus: A Complex Procedure for a Simple Process, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1015 (1993).
84. H.R. REP. No. 104-518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); see also HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra
note 4, § 3.1.
85. In addition, Congress created special restrictive measures for capital cases for those states
that opt-in to the requirements of these special procedures. Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 107, 110 Stat. 1214, 1221-26 (codified at
28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266 (2000)).
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were a one-year statute of limitations for filing § 2255 claims,86 limits
on appeals of denial of habeas or collateral relief,87 and limits on second
or successive § 2254 habeas petitions and § 2255 motions. 88 A subtext
of the AEDPA appears to have been lawmakers' displeasure with the
ability, and perceived willingness, of federal courts to act independently
and actually grant writs of habeas corpus to state and federal prisoners,
and particularly prisoners on death row.
One of the more significant changes brought about by the AEDPA
was the limitations placed on second or successive § 2255 motions. The
terms "second" or "successive" motion generally refer to a § 2255
motion that a federal prisoner may seek to file after he has litigated his
initial or first § 2255 motion.89
The need to file a second or successive motion may arise when a
prisoner discovers new facts, or when the law changes significantly after
the first motion. However, a rehearing on a previously litigated claim
may also become necessary. 90 Counterbalancing this need for further
federal court review are concerns that prisoners will take advantage of or
abuse the successive habeas motion process to delay review, or continu-
ally litigate the same claims. 91 Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA,
§ 2255 provided that no sentencing court was required to hear "a second
or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner" ;92
however, under pre-AEDPA law, successive § 2255 motions were heard
even on grounds similar to the previous motion.93 These pre-1996 stan-
86. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 105, at 1220 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 2255) (2000) ("A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section").
A similar one-year statute of limitations exists for state prisoners seeking federal habeas relief.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 106, at 1220-21 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1) (2000)). A great deal of litigation has occurred over the meaning of the one-year
statute of limitations, when it applies, and when it is tolled. See cases cited supra note 8.
87. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act §§ 102, 105, at 1217-18, 1220 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253, 2255 (2000)); see also HERTZ & LIBMAN, supra note 4, § 3.2.
88. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act §§ 101, 105, at 1217, 1220 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2255 (2000)); HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, § 3.2.
89. For further discussion on successive motions see HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, §§ 28,
41.7(d); Brent E. Newton, A Primer on Post-Conviction Habeas Review, CHAMPION, June 2005, at
16; Habeas Relief for Federal Prisoners, 91 GEO. L.J. 862 (2003); Jeffrey, supra note 13;
Stevenson, supra note 3.
Not all "second" petitions or motions will be considered second or successive for purposes of
the AEDPA. See, e.g., Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998) (holding that when
federal court dismissed one claim in petition on the grounds that the claim was premature, the
petitioner was not barred by the second and successive provisions of AEDPA from raising that
claim when it was ripe).
90. HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, § 28.1.
91. Id.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 2255; see HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, § 28.2b.
93. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4,
§§ 28.2b, 41.7(d).
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dards allowed, under certain circumstances, a successive motion on a
previously-litigated claim if the petitioner was not afforded a full and
fair hearing on the prior motion, or "if the ends of justice" warranted
another motion on the claim.94 The pre-AEDPA standards also allowed,
under certain circumstances, for a successive motion for claims not pre-
viously litigated.95 However, judicially created doctrines, such as the
abuse of the writ doctrine,9 6 limited a prisoner's ability to bring a suc-
cessive motion for either a new claim or a previously litigated claim.97
The AEDPA significantly changed the availability of successive
motions, making it much more difficult for a prisoner to obtain a second
collateral hearing. Specifically with respect to § 2255 motions, the
AEDPA added the following restrictions:
A second or successive motion must be certified as provided in sec-
tion 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain-
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of
the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found
the movant guilty of the offense; or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable.98
Thus, a second or successive motion under the AEDPA is only allowed
if there is new evidence that meets a very high evidentiary burden in
establishing innocence, or if there is a new rule of constitutional law that
the Supreme Court applies retroactively to cases pending on collateral
review. Neither the merits of the claim nor the actual innocence of the
prisoner alone can be grounds for a successive motion. Additionally, the
AEDPA does not allow for re-litigation of a claim previously heard in a
§ 2255 motion, even if a second or successive motion arguably would
have been allowed under the pre-AEDPA "ends of justice" exception. 99
Further, prior to bringing a second or successive petition,
the prisoner must undergo the certification process of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(3), which provides:
94. HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, §§ 28.1, 28.2b.
95. Id.
96. The abuse of the writ doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court in Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), and later modified in McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991),
essentially created a defense that the government could assert to bar review of a second or
successive motion on the grounds that the prisoner had abused the habeas corpus review process
by failing to raise a claim in an earlier motion. Congress codified the abuse of the writ standard in
its 1966 and 1976 amendments to the federal habeas statute. Id
97. HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, § 28.1.
98. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 105, 110 Stat. 1214, 1220 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000)).
99. See Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 368-69 (2d Cir. 1997).
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(A) Before a second or successive application permitted by this sec-
tion is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appro-
priate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to
consider the application.
(B) A motion in the court of appeals for an order authorizing the
district court to consider a second or successive application shall be
determined by a three-judge panel of the court of appeals.
(C) The court of appeals may authorize the filing of a second or suc-
cessive application only if it determines that the application makes a
prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of
this subsection.
(D) The court of appeals shall grant or deny the authorization to file a
second or successive application not later than 30 days after the filing
of the motion.
(E) The grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to
file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and
shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of
certiorari.'
Under the certification process of the AEDPA, the circuit courts of
appeals serve a "gatekeeping"' 0 ' function, and keep the courthouse
doors closed unless an individual meets the narrow criteria of new evi-
dence or new constitutional law entitling one to a second or successive
motion. This gatekeeping function does not address the ultimate merits
of the successive motion, that is, whether the prisoner is entitled to
relief; its function is to prevent a hearing on the merits at all. Moreover,
as difficult as it is to get the circuit court to open the door for successive
motion review, § 2244(b)(3) is not the end of the procedural barriers. In
addition, § 2244(b)(4) provides that "[a] district court shall dismiss any
claim presented in a second or successive application that the court of
appeals has authorized to be filed unless the applicant shows that the
claim satisfies the requirements of this section."'10 2 Accordingly, even if
the circuit court allows a litigant a hearing, the district court still may
slam the courthouse doors shut.
10 3
Plainly, the AEDPA erects significant obstacles to the initiation of
a second or successive motion. It is important to note that these restric-
tions keep a federal court from even hearing a case. Thus, even if the
prisoner has a meritorious claim, if he cannot survive the certification
100. 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(3) (2000).
101. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 657 (1996) ("[Section] 2241(b)(3) . . . creates a
'gatekeeping mechanism' for the consideration of second or successive applications ... .
102. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4).
103. See Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 899 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining that
under the certification process, a district court may deny review even after the circuit has granted
it).
[Vol. 60:75
STRUGGLING FOR FEDERAL JUDICIAL REVIEW
process, the federal court cannot hear his claim, cannot exercise its
power over it, and cannot grant appropriate relief. In this way, the
AEDPA not only restricts the remedies available to prisoners, but also
limits the power of federal courts.
Interestingly, however, a previous § 2255 motion does not trigger
any limits on § 2241 petitions brought by federal prisoners.' t 4 A pris-
oner who has litigated one or more § 2255 motions would not have to
surmount the certification process for second or successive motions in
order to file a § 2241 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Therefore,
§ 2241 initially appears to provide an attractive alternative to a § 2255
second or successive motion that has little likelihood of being heard.
Moreover, while the AEDPA changed many aspects of federal habeas
and collateral review, it left intact the savings clause of § 2255 that
offers the possibility of a § 2241 petition. As noted earlier, however, a
federal prisoner who is authorized to seek relief pursuant to a § 2255
motion may not file for habeas relief under § 2241 "unless it also
appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention."' 1 5 Thus, under the AEDPA, the scope of the
savings clause of § 2255 is of paramount importance to a prisoner who
is barred from pursuing a second or successive § 2255 motion.10 6
III. THE SEARCH FOR FEDERAL REvIEW OF SUCCESSIVE CLAIMS OF
ACTUAL INNOCENCE UNDER BAILEY V. UNITED STATES
Congress, in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), provides, in relevant part, that
any person who "during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm" shall be punished by a
term of imprisonment of not less than five years. 107 Prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Bailey, some circuit courts of appeals inter-
preted the term "use" in § 924(c)(1) as essentially equivalent to posses-
sion or presence of a firearm,108 while other circuits found that "use"
meant something more than mere possession. 09 In the mid-1990s, the
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the meaning of the
104. See Zayas v. INS, 311 F.3d 247, 255 (3d Cir. 2002); HERTZ & LIEnMAN, supra note 4,
§ 3.2. But see Simon v. United States, 359 F.3d 139, 142-44 (2d Cir. 2004) (observing that the
AEDPA does not apply to traditional habeas petitions brought pursuant to § 2241, but suggesting
that the AEDPA limits on second or successive motions may apply to § 2241 petitions).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000).
106. See Hack, supra note 3, at 181.
107. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2000).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Torres-Rodriguez, 930 F.2d 1375, 1385 (9th Cir. 1991); United
States v. McFadden, 13 F.3d 463, 465 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Hager, 969 F.2d 883, 889
(10th Cir. 1992).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Castro-Lara, 970 F.2d 976, 983 (1st Cir. 1992); United States
v. Feliz-Cordero, 859 F.2d 250, 254 (2d Cir. 1988).
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word "use." ,o Acknowledging that "use" may have different meanings,
the Court nevertheless found that "'use' must connote more than mere
possession of a firearm by a person who commits a drug offense."''
Rather, the Court concluded that to sustain a conviction under
§ 924(c)(1), the government must show that the defendant actively
employed a firearm during a drug-related offense. '1 2
The Supreme Court's holding in Bailey had the effect of not only
clarifying the meaning of the term "use" in on-going and future prosecu-
tions under § 924(c)(1), but it also had the potential effect of rendering
void already-imposed convictions that were based on an erroneous read-
ing of "use." Because the Supreme Court in Bailey was not creating
new law but rather clarifying pre-existing substantive law that some cir-
cuits had misinterpreted, the Court's construction of "use" was equally
applicable to pending and previously litigated cases. 1 3
Defendants whose cases were pending on direct appeal at the time
Bailey was handed down, and who were convicted under an erroneous
reading of § 924(c)(1), undoubtedly raised Bailey as an issue on direct
appeal. With respect to prisoners who had exhausted their direct
appeals, the Supreme Court had earlier indicated in Davis that a § 2255
motion was an appropriate remedy where a prisoner had been convicted
for engaging in behavior that was not in fact criminal.1 I 4 Moreover, in
Bousley v. United States,' 15 the Supreme Court explained that when the
Court interprets or decides the substantive meaning of a statute, that
decision applies retroactively to cases pending in collateral review, and
§ 2255 may provide an appropriate avenue to review such claims." 6
Thus, a federal prisoner wrongfully incarcerated under § 924(c)(1), but
who had exhausted his direct appeals, nonetheless could seek collateral
relief pursuant to a § 2255 motion. 7
However, by the time the Supreme Court decided Bailey, some fed-
eral prisoners not only had exhausted their direct appeals, but also had
already litigated at least one § 2255 motion. To pursue the Bailey claim,
these prisoners had to persuade a federal circuit court of appeals and a
federal district court to entertain a second or successive § 2255 motion.
110. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 142 (1995).
111. Id. at 143.
112. See id. at 148-50.
113. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620-21 (1998).
114. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1974).
115. 523 U.S. at 614.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 620-21. However, the Bousley Court noted that other procedural barriers, such
as procedural default, might still deprive the defendant of relief. Id. at 621.
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A. The Collision of the AEDPA Second or Successive Motion
Provisions and Claims of Innocence Under Bailey
As the Supreme Court noted more than thirty years ago, the contin-
ued incarceration of a person for non-criminal conduct "results in a com-
plete miscarriage of justice."' 118 As several circuit courts of appeals have
observed, before the AEDPA, a district court would have had the power
to hear a successive § 2255 motion raising the Bailey claim on the
ground that the ends of justice necessitate review of an incarceration for
a non-existent crime. 1 9 Yet, the rules have changed. Under the
AEDPA, a prisoner seeking a successive motion must undergo a certifi-
cation process to establish that the motion is based on either "newly
discovered evidence," or "a new rule of constitutional law.' 12° The
problem facing the prisoner seeking a second or successive § 2255
review of a Bailey claim is that Bailey merely interprets the meaning of
the term "use" in a federal statute.
The Second Circuit in Triestman v. United States12 1 considered a
successive § 2255 motion filed by a federal prisoner who challenged the
validity of his guilty plea to, inter alia, violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
by use of a firearm during a drug-related offense.1 22 Triestman had pre-
viously lost a direct appeal and three pro se § 2255 motions for collat-
eral relief. 123 His third pro se successive motion was pending before the
Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari when the Court decided Bai-
ley. 2 4 Approximately four months after the Court issued Bailey, it
denied certiorari review to Triestman.12 5 Then, a little less than five
months after the Court decided Bailey and two days after the Supreme
Court denied Triestman certiorari review, the AEDPA went into
effect. 12 6 Eleven days after the Supreme Court denied certiorari review
and nine days after the AEDPA and its amendments to successive
motions went into effect, Triestman filed another § 2255 motion raising
the Bailey claim. 127
The problem for Triestman, of course, was that Bailey fits neither
of the § 2255 exceptions that allow federal review of a successive
motion. The first exception allows successive review based on "newly
118. Davis, 417 U.S. at 346-47.
119. E.g., Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 367-68 (2d Cir. 1997).
120. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000).
121. 124 F.3d at 361.
122. Id. at 363-64. Triestman also pleaded guilty to two counts of drug conspiracy. Id. His




126. Id. at 365.
127. Id.
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discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence
as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant
guilty of the offense ..1.2.""8 Triestman did not rely on new evidence to
show that he was innocent of using a gun during a drug-related offense;
he argued that based on the evidence, the court applied the law incor-
rectly and punished him for conduct that was not criminal. This argu-
ment does not open the new evidence door of the successive motion
provisions.
The second exception for successive review applies when a pris-
oner raises "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases
on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavail-
able."' 29 Bailey clearly does not provide a new rule of constitutional
law. Rather, Bailey interprets and clarifies a federal statute. Although
Triestman argued that Bailey's statutory interpretation implicated the
Constitution, the Second Circuit rejected this argument and refused to
review Triestman's successive motion. 130
Other circuits agree with the Second Circuit. In In re Vial, 13 1 the
Fourth Circuit found that a federal prisoner could not seek a successive
petition on a Bailey claim, and specifically rejected the prisoner's argu-
ment that Bailey was a new rule of constitutional law.1 3 1 In United
States v. Lorentsen,133 the Ninth Circuit found that even if a prisoner
was factually innocent under Bailey, he nonetheless could not present
his claim in a successive § 2255 motion because Bailey was not newly
discovered evidence or a new rule of constitutional law.134 The Seventh
Circuit in In re Davenport135 found that the AEDPA amendments pre-
clude a successive motion on a Bailey claim. 136 Similarly, the Tenth
Circuit in Coleman v. United States, 137 held that a successive Bailey
motion did not meet the prima facie showing required for a successive
motion to proceed. 138 In In re Dorsainvil,139 the Third Circuit explicitly
found that a claim premised on Bailey was neither newly discovered
evidence nor a new rule of constitutional law, and thus did not fit into
128. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000).
129. Id.
130. Triestman, 124 F.3d at 372-73.
131. 115 F.3d 1192 (4th Cir. 1997).
132. Id. at 1195.
133. 106 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1997).
134. Id. at 279.
135. 147 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1998).
136. Id. at 611-12.
137. 106 F.3d 339 (10th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
138. Id. at 341.
139. 119 F.3d 245 (3rd Cir. 1997).
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the limited exceptions for successive motions under the AEDPA.14 o The
Fifth Circuit in Reyes-Requena v. United States, 4' found Bailey to be a
substantive, non-constitutional change in the law that could not be heard
in a successive § 2255 motion; 4 2 the Sixth Circuit in In re Hanserd4 3
denied a request to file a successive motion raising a Bailey claim
because the AEDPA successive motions standards precluded that
motion; 4 and the Eleventh Circuit in In re Blackshire 4 5 found that a
successive § 2255 motion was unavailable to Bailey claims. 4 6 Finally,
the D.C. Circuit held that a successive § 2255. motion was not available
to raise a Bailey claim, even though the court found that "[t]here is no
question that [the defendant's] conviction is no longer valid."'' 47
The overwhelming conclusion drawn by the circuit courts of
appeals is that a successive § 2255 motion does not provide recourse for
claims of actual innocence under Bailey. Although § 2255 was intended
to provide the same relief as a writ of habeas corpus, 48 and was
intended to remedy convictions based on non-criminal conduct, 149 the
§ 2255 successive motion rules close the door to federal court review
and bar federal courts from hearing certain Bailey claims, even though
some meritorious claims of innocence will go unheard.
B. Innocent Prisoners Saved by the Savings Clause of
§ 2255 and § 2241
The conclusion that the AEDPA prevents a federal court from hear-
ing the claim of an innocent federal prisoner - a prisoner who is wrong-
fully imprisoned for conduct that Congress did not in fact make criminal
- is troubling. This problem troubled the circuit courts as well. If factu-
ally innocent prisoners are denied access to the courts, the constitution-
ality of the AEDPA's successive motions provisions is potentially
jeopardized.
Shortly after the AEDPA became law, certain aspects of the succes-
sive petition provisions that apply to state prisoners were challenged as
amounting to an unconstitutional suspension of the writ. The Supreme
Court in Felker v. Turpin5 ° specifically examined § 2244(b)(3)(E),
140. Id. at 247-48.
141. 243 F.3d 893 (5th Cir. 2001).
142. Id. at 900.
143. 123 F.3d 922 (6th Cir. 1997).
144. Id. at 933-34.
145. 98 F.3d 1293 (11 th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
146. Id. at 1293-94; see also Abdullah v. Hedrick, 392 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2004).
147. In re Smith, 285 F.3d 6, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
148. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
149. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1974).
150. 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
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which provides: "The grant or denial of an authorization by a court of
appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable
and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of
certiorari."'' Reacting to this jurisdictional limit on its appellate
review, the Supreme Court referred to several post-Civil War cases deal-
ing with the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to review writs of
habeas corpus; in these post-Civil War cases the Court upheld Con-
gress's jurisdictional restrictions because Congress had not abrogated all
habeas corpus review by the Court.' 52 In reviewing the AEDPA succes-
sive motion provisions, the Court found that although Congress had
restricted the Court's appellate jurisdiction over certain aspects of suc-
cessive habeas petitions, Congress had not precluded a prisoner from
filing a petition for an original writ directly with the Supreme Court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.' Accordingly, the Court found that
retention of the Court's original jurisdiction under § 2241 assured access
to the Court, 5 4 even though the Court has not accepted original juris-
diction in such a case since the 1920s.' This potential, though rarely
used, avenue to Supreme Court original review was sufficient to defeat
the constitutional challenges to the successive provisions of the
AEDPA.'156 Moreover, the Court did not find that the successive provi-
sions, in and of themselves, constituted a suspension of the writ. 157
Rather, the Court found these rules represented an evolution of the abuse
of the writ doctrine that existed prior to the AEDPA.158
A different, albeit related, question emerges where the successive
petition rules are construed to preclude any review of a federal pris-
oner's claim of actual innocence. One way in which the Supreme Court
in Felker avoided a confrontation between the Constitution and the suc-
cessive petition provisions of the AEDPA was to find that the ability to
file an original petition with the Court pursuant to § 2241 provides con-
stitutionally adequate habeas review. 59 However, as the Second Circuit
framed the problem in Triestman, "serious constitutional questions
would arise if a person who can prove his actual innocence on the
existing record - and who could not have effectively raised his claim of
innocence at an earlier time - had no access to judicial review. '"160
151. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) (2000).
152. Felker, 518 U.S. at 658-62.
153. Id. at 660-61.
154. See id. at 660-62.
155. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONsTrTTiONAL LAW 158 (2d ed. 2002).
156. Felker, 518 U.S. at 661.
157. Id. at 664.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 662.
160. Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 363 (2d Cir. 1997).
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A complete denial of review raises several constitutional problems.
First, under the Suspension Clause, Congress may only suspend the writ
of habeas corpus "when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it."'' If Congress cuts off all meaningful review to
prisoners held for nonexistent crimes, it raises the specter that Congress
has suspended the writ with respect to them. While the precise method
for determining what constitutes a suspension of the writ may not be
completely clear, 1 62 the prospect of denying all review is, at the very
least, constitutionally troubling. Second, the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall "be deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law .... ,163 At issue here are
cases where individuals were convicted under then-existing erroneous
interpretations of a federal criminal statute that rendered non-criminal
conduct criminal. After these individuals' convictions were final and
they pursued collateral review, the Supreme Court struck down the erro-
neous interpretation of the statute, clarifying that the conduct for which
they were serving criminal sentences was not, and never had been,
unlawful. If these wrongfully confined individuals cannot get meaning-
ful habeas hearings based upon proper interpretations of the law, the
legal system faces serious questions regarding this lack of due process.
Third, a potential Eighth Amendment problem emerges when a person is
forced to serve a criminal sentence for a non-existent crime.' 64
One solution that avoids addressing the constitutionality of the
AEDPA is to use the savings clause of § 2255 to allow prisoners to
bring § 2241 habeas petitions for hearings on their innocence claims. 165
The Second Circuit availed itself of this remedy in Triestman, when a
prisoner with a strong Bailey claim of innocence was unable to obtain a
successive hearing. 166 The savings clause of § 2255 provides that a pris-
oner may seek a writ of habeas corpus if it appears that a motion under
§ 2255 "is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his deten-
tion." 167 While recognizing the significant limits of the savings clause
161. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
162. In general, the Supreme Court has required a specific and unambiguous statement of
congressional intent to repeal habeas corpus jurisdiction in order to constitute a suspension of the
writ. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298-99 (1993); Felker, 518 U.S. at 660-61.
163. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
164. See Triestman, 124 F.3d at 379.
165. Some commentators have suggested other vehicles, such as a writ of coram nobis or a
writ under the All Writs Act, as providing alternative avenues for review. See Hack, supra note 3,
at 211-18; Jeffrey, supra note 13, at 62. At least one court considering these writs with respect to
successive Bailey claims has declined to allow review on that basis. In re Davenport, 147 F.3d
605, 607-08 (7th Cir. 1998).
166. Triestman, 124 F.3d at 373.
167. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000).
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of § 2255, the Triestman court found that the terms "inadequate" and
"ineffective" include cases of legal as well as practical difficulty, and
that the savings clause may provide review in certain of these cases. 68
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit did not provide an expansive read-
ing of the savings clause of § 2255. In fact, the Second Circuit made
clear that the savings clause is not available simply because a prisoner
encounters substantive or procedural barriers to review, including barri-
ers created by the AEDPA amendments.169 The Second Circuit instead
observed:
We have already stated that "inadequate or ineffective" is not limited
merely to the practical considerations suggested by the government,
but refers to something that is still less than the full set of cases in
which § 2255 is either unavailable or unsuccessful. We now hold
that that "something" is, at the least, the set of cases in which the
petitioner cannot, for whatever reason, utilize § 2255, and in which
the failure to allow for collateral review would raise serious constitu-
tional questions."7
The Second Circuit concluded that the preclusion of review under
§ 2255 of Triestman's Bailey claim raises serious due process and cruel
and unusual punishment concerns, and potentially calls into question the
constitutionality of the successive provisions of the AEDPA.' 71 Because
review of Triestman's Bailey claim was previously unavailable, 7 2 and
because the preclusion of such review raises significant constitutional
issues, the Second Circuit found that § 2255, at least with respect to
Triestman and other similarly situated federal prisoners, was inadequate
and ineffective.173 Triestman, therefore, was entitled to pursue a § 2241
petition in district court. 174  Since the Triestman decision, the Second
Circuit has made clear that the only claims that have fit within the sav-
ings clause to date are those where the prisoner is actually innocent and
where he could not have effectively raised his claim in an earlier
168. Triestman, 124 F.3d at 375-76.
169. Id. at 376.
170. Id. at 377.
171. Id. at 376-78.
172. Subsequently, in Jiminiam v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2001), the Second Circuit
clarified that § 2255 is not considered inadequate or ineffective where the prisoner had a prior
opportunity to raise his claim on direct appeal or in a prior motion. Id. at 147-48.
173. Triestman, 124 F.3d at 380.
174. Id. It should be noted that simply because a prisoner with a Bailey claim receives a
hearing under § 2241 does not mean that the prisoner will receive relief. First, the Supreme Court
in Bousley found that prisoners wishing to raise a Bailey claim in collateral review may face
procedural barriers if the prisoner failed to properly raise the issue on direct appeal. Bousley v.
United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998). Second, under Bousley, the prisoner will have to show
that, based on Bailey and in light of all the evidence, no reasonable jury would have convicted him
of violating § 924(c). See De Jesus v. United States, 161 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1998).
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proceeding. 175
The Third Circuit also recognized that the successive motion pre-
clusion of Bailey claims is constitutionally problematic, and in Dor-
sainvil found that resort to the savings clause and § 2241 was an
appropriate solution. 176 Providing a very narrow application of the sav-
ings clause, the Third Circuit found § 2241 an appropriate avenue for
review where a federal prisoner has not had a previous opportunity for a
hearing on a claim that his conviction has been affected by a substantive
change in the law rendering his conduct non-criminal. 77 In reaching
this conclusion, the Dorsainvil court noted:
If, as the Supreme Court stated in Davis, it is a "complete miscarriage
of justice" to punish a defendant for an act that the law does not make
criminal, thereby warranting resort to the collateral remedy afforded
by § 2255, it must follow that it is the same "complete miscarriage of
justice" when the AEDPA amendment to § 2255 makes that collat-
eral remedy unavailable.1 78
While cautioning that the savings clause would not provide an avenue
for habeas review "merely because that petitioner is unable to meet the
stringent gatekeeping requirements of the amended § 2255,"179 the Third
Circuit nonetheless reasoned that based on the unusual circumstances of
Dorsainvil's case, there was no reason why § 2241 would not be
available. 80
As the Seventh Circuit stated in Davenport, the "essential function"
of the writ of habeas corpus "is to give a prisoner a reasonable opportu-
nity to obtain a reliable judicial determination of the fundamental legal-
ity of his conviction and sentence."'' 8 1 The Davenport court found that a
Bailey challenge - that is, a challenge that a prisoner is being held in
prison for a nonexistent crime - goes to the essential function of habeas
corpus. 8 2 Although the successive motion provisions preclude review
of Bailey claims, the savings clause of § 2255 offers another avenue to
review. While rejecting the Second Circuit's formulation that a prisoner
could use § 2241 where the lack of a successive review raised serious
175. Cephas v. Nash, 328 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2003).
176. In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 1997).
177. Id. at 251.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. As contrary examples, in United States v. Brooks, 230 F.3d 643 (3d Cir. 2000), the
court refused to find § 2255 inadequate or inefficient where the prisoner had a previous
opportunity to fully litigate the claim he wished to raise in a § 2241 petition, and in Okereke v.
United States, 307 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 2002), the court, applying Dorsainvil, found that § 2255 was
not inadequate or ineffective with respect to the prisoner's inability to raise Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), in a successive motion.
181. In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998).
182. Id. at 610.
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constitutional problems, the Seventh Circuit nevertheless found that the
savings clause and § 2241 provide review where the prisoner has "had
no reasonable opportunity to obtain earlier judicial correction of a funda-
mental defect in his conviction or sentence because the law changed
after his first 2255 motion."'' 83 While opening § 2241 to Bailey claims,
the Seventh Circuit imposed three requirements for the application of
§ 2255's savings clause: (1) a change in the law made retroactive by the
Supreme Court,' 84 (2) the change in the law is not one in which the
prisoner is entitled to a successive motion review, and (3) the alleged
change in the law is not merely a difference between the law in the
circuit of the sentencing court as opposed to the habeas court. 85
Similarly, in Reyes-Requena v. United States,'8 6 the Fifth Circuit
relied upon the savings clause to allow a prisoner with a Bailey claim to
bring a § 2241 petition.' 87 Reiterating that the savings clause's inade-
quacy or inefficiency language should be applied stringently, the court
nonetheless found that an exception should apply to Bailey claims. 88 In
an attempt to reconcile the differing circuits' approaches to the succes-
sive motion and Bailey dilemma, the Fifth Circuit articulated two sav-
ings clause requirements: (1) the prisoner was convicted of a
"nonexistent offense" based on a Supreme Court decision that applies
retroactively; and (2) review of the claim was foreclosed in a previous
direct appeal or § 2255 motion. 89 Under this test, the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that the prisoner in question presented a claim based on actual
innocence due to a retroactive Supreme Court decision that rendered his
conduct non-criminal, and that he could not have previously presented
this claim.'90 Under these circumstances, the prisoner could pursue a
§ 2241 petition on his Bailey claim.' 9 '
In In re Jones, 9 2 the Fourth Circuit, relying on concerns similar to
those expressed by the other circuits, also found that the savings clause
of § 2255 encompassed certain claims based on Bailey. 93 Specifically,
183. Id. at 611.
184. As explained in Bousley, and as the Court more recently clarified in Schriro v. Summerlin,
124 S. Ct. 2519, 2522-23 (2004), the Teague retroactivity doctrine applies only to new rules of
criminal procedure, see supra note 11; changes in substantive federal criminal law apply
retroactively.
185. Davenport, 147 F.3d at 611-12.
186. 243 F.3d 893 (5th Cir. 2001).
187. Id. at 901, 906.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 904.
190. Id. at 904-05.
191. Id. at 906.
192. 226 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 2000).
193. Id. at 333-34.
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the Fourth Circuit found that a prisoner could avail himself of the sav-
ings clause when:
(1) [A]t the time of conviction, settled law of this circuit or the
Supreme Court established the legality of the conviction; (2) subse-
quent to the prisoner's direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the sub-
stantive law changed such that the conduct of which the prisoner was
convicted is deemed not to be criminal; and (3) the prisoner cannot
satisfy the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255 because the new rule is
not one of constitutional law. 194
Applying this standard, the court allowed the prisoner in question to file
a § 2241 petition.195
The Ninth Circuit in Lorentsen v. Hood,'9 6 also considered the vari-
ous circuits' responses to the Bailey problem, and summarized these
responses as providing that the savings clause of § 2255 allows "in
essence, that a federal prisoner who is 'actually innocent' of the crime of
conviction, but who never has had 'an unobstructed procedural shot' at
presenting a claim of innocence, may resort to § 2241 if the possibility
of relief under § 2255 is foreclosed."' 97 The Ninth Circuit, however,
ultimately did not feel compelled to embrace this test because it found
the prisoner was guilty of using a gun under the new interpretation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c), and thus not entitled to a hearing.1 98
Finally, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits also have weighed the prob-
lem. The Sixth Circuit observed that, in Bailey cases, other circuits had
allowed the claims to be heard pursuant to § 2241, and thus concluded
that § 2241 is arguably available to a factually innocent prisoner who is
otherwise barred under the AEDPA from a federal hearing on his
claim. 199 Similarly, after reviewing the other circuits' consideration of
these issues, the Eighth Circuit concluded that to take advantage of the
savings clause, prisoners must show both actual innocence and an inabil-
ity to attain previous review of the claim.200
Thus, just as the circuit courts overwhelmingly agree that succes-
sive motions are unavailable to raise a Bailey claim, the circuits have
reacted with equal concern that this preclusion presents significant con-
stitutional problems, and uniformly agree that these concerns are best
resolved by resort to the savings clause of § 2255 and § 2241. Although
the circuits have not devised precisely uniform tests for the application
194. Id.
195. Id. at 334.
196. 223 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2000).
197. Id. at 954.
198. Id. at 955-56.
199. Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 757 (6th Cir. 1999).
200. Abdullah v. Hedrick, 392 F.3d 957, 960-63 (8th Cir. 2004).
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of the savings clause, they have focused consistently on two elements
that make § 2241 an appropriate remedy: (1) under a substantive change
in the law, the federal prisoner is factually innocent, and (2) the prisoner
had no prior opportunity to raise his claim. As the Third Circuit
observed in United States v. Brooks,20 "[i]ndeed, a common theme is
evident in the circuit court opinions addressing the availability of
§ 2241: in those cases in which recourse to § 2241 is granted, the peti-
tioner would have no other means of having his or her claim heard. ' 20 2
Evidently, federal courts are unwilling to construe the AEDPA so as to
cut off all federal court review to prisoners with colorable claims of
innocence under Bailey.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BAILEY SUCCESSIVE
MOTION DILEMMA
No doubt, the AEDPA forbids a successive § 2255 hearing for
claims of factual innocence under Bailey. The language of the
AEDPA's successive motion provisions makes no exceptions for inno-
cent prisoners who are serving time for a nonexistent crime. Yet, federal
courts are reluctant to apply such a draconian interpretation of the
AEDPA so as to preclude all of their power to review the claims of these
prisoners. Relying on the history of the writ and construing the AEDPA
to avoid a constitutional showdown, federal courts turn to § 2241, the
traditional writ of habeas corpus, to grant federal court review to prison-
ers serving federal criminal sentences for nonexistent crimes. Of course,
getting into court through a § 2241 petition does not necessarily mean
that these prisoners will be released from their prison sentences. It
means, simply, that they will get a hearing. At this hearing, both the
prisoner and the government can present evidence on whether the pris-
oner is actually innocent under Bailey and thereby entitled to relief. The
circuit courts' various constructions of the savings clause and § 2241
merely open the courthouse door.
Whether the concern is an unconstitutional suspension of the writ, a
violation of due process, or the prospect of an Eighth Amendment viola-
tion caused by incarcerating a prisoner for non-criminal behavior, fed-
eral courts recognize the emergence of serious constitutional problems
when the restrictive provisions of the AEDPA collide with claims of
actual innocence. At least in cases involving a successive motion raising
a Bailey claim, the courts are unwilling to relinquish their traditional role
of providing review. Yet, the courts' constructions of the savings clause
in these cases should not be overstated. The courts have constructed not
201. 230 F.3d 643 (3d Cir. 2000).
202. Id. at 648.
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a blanket actual innocence exception to successive motions, but only a
narrow exception that closely tracks the unusual circumstances of the
Bailey claims. The circuit courts may have opened the courthouse to
successive petitions raising Bailey claims of actual innocence, but they
opened it only a crack.
The successive motion provisions of the AEDPA, in the cases dis-
cussed above, come perilously close to undermining what Judge Posner
described as the essential function of habeas review: "to give a prisoner
a reasonable opportunity to obtain a reliable judicial determination of the
fundamental legality of his conviction and sentence. ' 0 3 To the extent
the courts see the AEDPA as completely eviscerating this judicial func-
tion, the courts choose to avoid a head-on confrontation with the consti-
tutional validity of the AEDPA by allowing review in a limited number
of cases. Although a judicial solution to the problem of successive
motions that raise Bailey claims has been found, the fact that courts had
to find a solution reflects the AEDPA's indifference to, and neglect of,
innocent prisoners. Only through a quite convoluted process are courts
able to hear successive motions presenting Bailey claims, even though
Bailey claims go to the heart of the function of habeas review. Moreo-
ver, because of the courts' narrow construction of the savings clause,
there is no guarantee that courts will have the power to hear other suc-
cessive claims of actual innocence.
A more workable alternative would be for Congress to include an
innocence exception within its successive motions provisions.2 °4
Although a prisoner may bring a successive claim based on new evi-
dence that meets the high threshold of demonstrating innocence, this
exception is too narrow to provide review of all claims of actual inno-
cence. A more general innocence exception would provide a clear,
straight-forward method for reviewing all meritorious claims of actual
innocence and would give federal courts the independence to review and
provide relief in appropriate cases. This exception would not be a get-
out-of-jail-free card; it would merely simplify and provide a federal
court hearing for Bailey claims and other claims of actual innocence that
do not fit neatly within the constraints of the AEDPA.
Unfortunately, Congress does not seem to be moving in this direc-
tion. Although bills are currently pending in the Senate and the House
of Representatives to amend the federal habeas review statutes once
203. In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998).
204. Other commentators have recommended innocence exceptions with respect to other
AEDPA restrictions such as the statute of limitations. See Jake Sussman, Unlimited Innocence:
Recognizing an "Actual Innocence" Exception to AEDPA's Statute of Limitations, 27 N.Y.U.
RaV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 343 (2001-2002).
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205again, neither bill takes any steps to assure federal court review for
innocent prisoners. To the contrary, the pending legislation seems cal-
culated to further reduce court review and quicken the habeas process.20 6
The proposed bills, like the current restrictions on successive motions in
the AEDPA, create the very real possibility that meritorious claims and
claims of actual innocence will go unheard. Perhaps federal courts, like
in the successive petition Bailey cases, will feel compelled to craft a
limited exception for cases where there is a colorable claim of inno-
cence, or where serious constitutional errors call into question the valid-
ity of the conviction and sentence. However, as the Bailey cases
suggest, even where the courts feel compelled to craft such an exception,
the exception is crafted in an extremely narrow way.
Part of the intent of the AEDPA is not only to limit the ability of
federal prisoners to seek habeas relief, but also to restrict the indepen-
dence and discretion of federal courts to hear and grant such claims for
relief. As the problem of successive motions and Bailey claims sug-
gests, the AEDPA's restrictions and inattention to claims of innocence
create an environment where a prisoner serving a sentence for a nonexis-
tent crime may have no judicial remedy for his plainly unlawful deten-
tion. By failing to take a broader view of the fundamental role of the
writ of habeas corpus in American law, and by failing to accord suffi-
cient independence to federal courts to hear all claims of factual inno-
cence, the AEDPA adds unnecessary complexity to habeas and collateral
review, threatens to consign federal courts to the sidelines, and creates
the very real risk that innocent prisoners' claims will go unheard.
205. See, e.g., H.R. 3035, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 1088, 109th Cong. (2005).
206. See, e.g., H.R. 3035 §§ 4, 6, 9.
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